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Abstract: This paper argues that the theoretical model of causal inference underpinning RCTs is frequently 
undermined by the failure of different actors involved in their implementation to behave in ways required by the 
model. This is not a problem unique to RCTs, but it poses a greater challenge to them because it undercuts their 
claims to methodological superiority based on the ‘clean identification’ of causal effects.  
The 2019 Nobel Prize in Economics was awarded to three leading proponents of randomized 
control trials (RCTs) on the grounds that their carefully designed field experiments were 
providing reliable answers to the question of ‘what works’ in the fight against global poverty. 
What distinguishes RCTs from non-experimental approaches to this question is the random 
assignment of subjects drawn from a similar population to treatment and control groups prior 
to an intervention. Its proponents claim that this allows them to avoid the selection biases 
associated with retrospective evaluations so that difference in the outcomes of interest can be 
‘cleanly’ attributed to the intervention. As others point out, it also minimizes the need for 
contextual information to identify confounding influences on outcomes or to interpret causal 
processes (Deaton and Cartwright, 2018; Shaffer, 2011).  
The growing dominance of RCTs has not gone unchallenged; critiques encompassing ethical, 
methodological and political issues. In this contribution, I focus on examples of RCT 
‘misbehaviour’ and their implications for the causal stories that RCTs seek to tell. I borrow 
the term from an article by Buvinic (1986) on project ‘misbehaviour’ which explored the 
reasons why certain projects systematically failed to realize their stated goals. It was, of 
course, not the projects that misbehaved. Rather, the misbehaviour represented the 
(frequently unanticipated) agency of stakeholders involved with the project acting on their 
particular assumptions, interests and constraints or responding to contextual differences in 
ways that undermined project effectiveness.  I draw on studies of three RCTs conducted by 
leading proponent in the field to discuss the challenge that similar forms of misbehaviour 
present for their methodological claims.  
Two of my examples are drawn from the Graduation Programme co-ordinated by the 
Innovations for Poverty Action (IPA). This carried out RCTs in six countries to test the 
generalizability of the Targeting the Ultra Poor (TUP) approach pioneered by BRAC, 
Bangladesh. The approach combined asset transfers to women in poverty with other 
supportive measures intended to build their entrepreneurial capacity. A second group of 
researchers, including myself, were simultaneously commissioned by the funders of 
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Graduation Programme to carry out qualitative assessments of two other TUP projects being 
implemented in West Bengal (India) and Sindh (Pakistan) in close proximity to the 
Graduation RCTs.  Despite funders’ efforts, IPA refused to consider the possibility of an 
integrated approachi.   I was, nevertheless, curious to explore reasons for overlaps and 
divergences in the findings reported by the two sets of studies (Kabeer, 2019).  A close 
reading of relevant publications brought to light examples of misbehaviour in both RCTs 
which, I would argue, seriously compromised the usefulness of their findings.  
The ‘misbehaviour’ in the West Bengal RCT was by selected beneficiaries.  36% of the 
households invited to participate in the ‘treatment’ group turned down the invitation. They 
were ‘predominantly Muslim’, reportedly suspicious of the motives of the implementing 
agency. The RCT dealt with this by confining their estimates to ‘intent to treat’ effects of the 
project. These averaged project’s impacts across those who were invited to participate in the 
treatment, regardless of whether they accepted or not. The researchers justified their focus on 
the grounds that these estimates ‘[gave] the expected impact of the project’ and ‘[were] most 
relevant to the issue of scaling up the programme’ (Banerjee et al., 2011: 10).  
An alternative estimate would have been ‘treatment on the treated’ effects which average 
effects for those who actually participated in the project, arguably providing more realistic 
measures of impact. The one example provided of both estimates – 15% increase in per capita 
consumption for all invited households compared to 25% for just those who accepted the 
invitation – suggested that households that refused to participate reported considerably lower, 
even negative, impacts. As critics have pointed out, the RCT preoccupation with ‘average’ 
effects leads to the neglect of the distributional issues, despite the fact that these have 
particular relevance to the political economy of ‘scaling up’ (Bardhan, 2013). In the West 
Bengal study, the distribution of benefits was systematically skewed against a marginalized 
religious minority, potentially exacerbating pre-existing social divisions.  
In the Sindh RCT, it was those responsible for the randomization process who ‘misbehaved’.  
Five implementing organizations were required to identify the least developed villages within 
selected locations, select the poorest households through participatory techniques and use a 
lottery to randomly assign half the selected households in each village to treatment groups 
and the other half to control groups. Unfortunately, miscommunication meant that while 
some of the organizations used lotteries, others simply assigned selected households in half of 
their villages to the treatment group and selected households in the other half to the control 
group.  
This misbehaviour was not discussed in publications by the concerned RCT scholars (Karlan 
and Parienté, 2014; Banerjee et al. 2015). It was reported instead in an independent 
evaluation of the Sindh TUP projects by Innovative Development Strategies (2012)  
commissioned by Pakistan Poverty Alleviation Fund. As it pointed out, the problematic 
sampling process meant there was no guarantee that relevant characteristics were identically 
distributed across treatment and control households or indeed that they were equally poor. As 
it happened, a later publication by IPA/J-PAL (2015) celebrating the ‘successful targeting of 
the ultra-poor households’ by the Graduation RCTs reported, without comment, that 82% of 
the households selected to participate in the Sind RCT started out above the poverty line.  
My third example draws on an ‘insider’ account of an RCT on microcredit in Morocco 
carried out by J-PAL in collaboration with a major microfinance organization (Bédécarrats et 
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al. 2019). Two of the authors of this account had, at the request of the funders of the project, 
carried out a qualitative study alongside the RCT. The J-PAL team declined to collaborate. 
However, the insider status of the qualitative team allowed them detailed insights into the 
unfolding of the RCT, including examples of misplaced assumptions and unruly practices 
that undermined the experimental design of the study.  
For instance, the plan was to locate the RCT in remote villages assumed to be free of 
microcredit, thereby allowing isolation of the effects of the ‘treatment’.  In reality, the 
selected villages varied considerably in terms of proximity to urban areas and many had 
access to microfinance organizations. Most of these left halfway through the RCT because of 
a default crisis in the sector but their presence muddied the impacts captured by the end line 
survey.  
Furthermore, based on experience in urban areas, the RCT anticipated high demand for 
microfinance for entrepreneurial purpose. In reality, demand was found to be extremely low 
and heterogeneous, ranging from zero in some villages to 55% in others. This seriously 
compromised the study’s ability to detect small effects when comparing treatment and control 
households. Consequently, the J-Pal team undertook various ‘tweaks’ to deal with the 
problem.  
One set of tweaks served to modify the intervention: additional information campaigns were 
launched to motivate demand; bonuses were introduced to incentivize loan officers; and the 
minimum quota for women was dropped as men were assumed to have a higher propensity to 
borrow.  The other set of tweaks modified the sampling approach: village borders were 
altered in the hope of finding more clients, new households were added to the end-line survey 
and villages with zero take-up were dropped. By the end of the project, it was unclear what or 
who was being evaluated, since both supply of microfinance and definition of treatment 
group had undergone considerable change as the experiment progressed. However, the  
subsequent publication about the RCT (Crépon et al, 2015) failed to refer to any breaches of 
protocol or to critiques published by the qualitative researchers.  
The examples cited here raise a problematic issue. It was only possible to gain insights into 
‘misbehaviour’ within these RCTs by careful re-reading of available materials by an ‘outside’ 
researcher and through the ‘insider’ knowledge of an independent qualitative team. This is in 
line with the assertion by Barrett and Carter (2010) that, unlike publications in the natural 
sciences, RCT publications rarely report crucial details about deviations between design and 
implementation. We therefore do not know how widespread these deviations are or how they 
affect the validity of reported results. Yet such misbehaviour is common to all field-based 
evaluations and, as Deaton (2010) notes, there is nothing that grants RCTs special immunity. 
It is therefore puzzling that RCTs are not more transparent about the problems they encounter 
and their efforts to deal with them.  A plausible explanation, suggested by Bédécarrats et al., 
is that such transparency might compromise the claims to simplicity and rigour that underlie 
the ‘gold standard’ status of RCTs. They would run the danger of becoming just one of many 
‘good enough’ methodologies seeking to reconcile theoretical assumptions with the 
messiness of the field.  
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i	Although the Graduation Programme commissioned quantitative and qualitative studies, the only RCT of a TUP 
pilot that attempted to integrate the findings of a qualitative study was carried out independently of the IPA 
(Bauchet et al, 2015). Some RCT researchers have long advocated the need to combine RCTs with other methods 
(White, 2009), but progress remains extremely slow.  
	
